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Abstract
Credit market imperfections give rise to boom-bust cycle episodes in emerging markets. In the
present paper, we aim to provide a comprehensive analysis for Eastern Europe. We focus on docu-
menting credit market imperfections, asymmetric nancing opportunities across sectors, and business
cycle uctuations at the aggregate and sectoral level. The results will be discussed in the policy con-
text of the re-regulation of the nancial system. We will propose in an unconventional way to think
about the early introduction of the Euro currency.
JEL Classication: F34, F36, G32, G38
Keywords: asymmetric nancing opportunities, currency mismatch, sectoral business cycles1 Motivation
The aim of this paper is to give an overview on credit market imperfections in Eastern Europe and to
discuss their likely impact on business cycles. In the case of emerging markets, a growing literature
has recently been discussing the eects of credit market imperfections on episodes of boom-bust cycles.
In the presence of credit market imperfections it is argued, that rms (and banks) will nd it optimal
to denominate their debt in foreign currency in order to overcome credit constraints. The exchange
rate, then, amplies the business cycles, as the value of debt aects the ability of rms to borrow from
the banking system (see Schneider and Tornell (2004)). Evidence on this mechanism, mostly from
Latin America and Asia, has been provided in Tornell and Westermann (2002) and IMF (2005). More
recently, some authors have raised the question whether some Eastern European countries might be next
to experience boom-bust cycle episodes, in particular in the run-up to the Euro (see Eichengreen and
Steiner (2008)). In the present paper, we aim to investigate whether this hypothesis can be sustained
by looking at both, macroeconomic and rm level data. In both data sets we focus on the analysis of
sectoral as well as aggregate data.
The rst contribution of our analysis is to document the existence of credit market imperfections in
Eastern Europe. Using a Worldbank survey data set on perceived credit constraints, we show for ten
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), namely Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, that partly severe credit constraints exist.
However, these credit constraints are not uniform across sectors of the economy. In particular small, and
non-export rms, as well as rms operating in sectors that are conventionally classied as non-tradable,
such as construction and transportation, report that access to nancial markets is a major obstacle to
running their business. This nding can also be established in a more formal analysis of the determinants
of credit constraints that controls for country eects, the age of the rms, and other control variables.
This evidence on credit constraints is consistent with the observation that most Eastern European
countries are characterized by a very high degree of foreign currency liabilities.1 As over the past years,
most countries in this setting have experienced a real appreciation as well as rapid expansions in domestic
credit, the recent episode in Eastern Europe indeed appears reminiscent of the experiences that were
observed in several emerging markets during lending booms that typically preceded twin banking and
currency crisis.
1 For a discussion of foreign currency liabilities and their implications for macroeconomic stability in Eastern Europe
see also Yeyati (2006).
1Following up on this hypothesis, the second contribution of our paper is to analyze the impact of credit
market imperfections on business cycles in Eastern Europe. In this part, we focus on cycles at a sectoral
rather than the aggregate level. Our main hypothesis is that the sectors producing non-tradable goods
will display dierent cyclical patterns than the sector producing mostly tradable goods.2 We split the
exercise up into two parts: In the rst part we document that sectoral cycles in Eastern Europe are
much more volatile than in Western Europe and that - in countries experiencing a lending boom - there
is a long-run trend towards non-tradable goods production. In the second part we employ recent time
techniques to distinguish formally between common and idiosyncratic components of sectoral business
cycles in Eastern Europe. While Johansen cointegration tests (Johansen, 1988, 1991) show that long
run trends between sectors in the CEECs are less evident than in Western Europe, the common features
tests (Engle and Kozicki, 1993; Cubadda, 1999) show that neither for Eastern nor for Western Europe
convincing evidence of common cycles across sectors can be found. The results of the analysis of the
business cycles at sectoral level are therefore consistent with the view that the domestic non-tradable
sector is catching up during a lending boom to the tradable sector The latter is largely unaected by
domestic nancial conditions due to its capability to raise nancing on international capital markets.
Overall, we nd that Eastern Europe is indeed a region where the settings for the experience of boom-
bust cycles are given, although the degree to which this is an immediate concern varies across countries.
Certainly there are also exceptions to the general path in each of the items described above and this
will be discussed in the paper. Nevertheless, in many countries the Euroisation has already proceeded
substantially, and credit constraints are observed at least in some sectors of the economy. We nd
these observations remarkable and will argue in an unconventional manner that they could alter the
way in which policy makers think about an early introduction of the Euro in Eastern Europe. While the
traditional Optimal Currency Area (OCA) literature would suggest to keep the exchange rate exible to
stabilize the business cycle, our analysis suggests that the exchange rate might just do the opposite: It
might amplify country specic shocks.3 In the nal part of the paper we discuss these policy aspects
of the empirical ndings and link it to a recent literature on optimal monetary policy under xed and
exible exchange rate regimes in the presence of credit market imperfections (see Lahiri et al. (2006)).
In this section, we also point out that the most recent depreciation of nominal exchange rates in Eastern
2 Note that the real exchange rate can be interpreted as the relative price between tradable and non-tradable goods.
Recognizing this, Schneider and Tornell (2004) have modelled an internally consistent mechanism of boom-bust cycles
in a two-sector model.
3 A high correlation in aggregate business cycles between Eastern and Western Europe in this case would not be needed
to recommend an early introduction of the Euro. See Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006) for an overview of studies testing
aggregate correlation of business cycles.
2Europe with respect to the Euro might entail the risk of an increased debt burden of rms, that could
further slow down the recovery from the present world wide economic slowdown that also aects Eastern
Europe.
2 Currency mismatch and lending booms in Eastern Europe
In the following sections, we aim to document, that macroeconomic variables, as well as rm-level evi-
dence on nancing opportunities in dierent sectors in the Eastern European economies are reminiscent
of emerging market countries that have experienced boom-bust cycle episodes in the past two decades.
As a start, we consider the foreign currency denomination of debt. The data are taken from the Word
Bank Regulation and Supervision Database (2007). Figure 1 shows that there is a wide range of foreign
currency shares. Bulgaria and the Baltic countries, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, have shares of more
than 50%, while Poland and the Czech Republic have rather low shares of less than 20%, a value that
is typical for countries in the EMU. These are substantial amounts and are close to the values observed
in Latin America and East Asia during the 1990ies.

















Note: The Figure shows the reponses to question 7.8 ("What percent of the commercial banking system's liabilities is
foreign-currency denominated?") of part 7 (Liquidity & Diversication Requirements) of the 2007 Bank Regulation and
Supervision Database. Data Report Tables of Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs, 2005) are used for Estonia and the
EMU average. The latter is based on available EU12 countries, excluding Ireland and Finland.
Source: Bank Regulation and Supervision Database 2007 provided by Barth et al. (2008) and Financial Soundness Indicators
by the IMF (2008a).
As pointed out in Schneider and Tornell (2004) and Tornell and Westermann (2005), a high degree of
foreign currency liabilities can lead to balance sheet eects in the aggregate, when rms, in particular
3in the non-tradable sector, have revenues in domestic currency, while debt is denominated in foreign
currency. This phenomena is often referred to as currency mismatch. In many emerging markets that
were characterized by substantial degree of currency mismatch, a real appreciation has reduced the value
of the debt, that was denominated in foreign currency, and has allowed rms to borrow more and more.
Occasionally, when the currency depreciated again, the resulting lending booms have then ended in joint
banking and currency crisis. The following graphs show that a similar pattern may indeed be emerging
in Eastern Europe.


















Note: Real eective exchanges rates are monthly average trade-weighted eective rates. Consumer prices are used as
deator for real values. An increase of the index indicates an appreciation of national currency (i.e. the inverse of the
conventional denition.
Source: Eurostat (2009).
Figure 2 shows that almost all countries under consideration have experienced a real appreciation over
the last decade. This trend is evident in all countries except for Slovenia, that recently joined the EMU
and where the real exchange rate has been nearly constant over time. Clearly, this real appreciation is
also related to the well known Balassa-Samuelson eect. In nominal terms, the evidence is less clear and
often there are larger cyclical swings in either direction. However, over our sample period, all countries,
except Latvia and Romania, have appreciated also in nominal terms. Furthermore, there are dierent
exchange rate regimes.4 In particular Lithuania, Estonia and Bulgaria have xed their exchange rates
after the initial phase of appreciation.
4 See Table 11 in the appendix for an overview of the the present exchange rate regimes.
4As Figure 3 shows, the real appreciation in the presence of a high degree of foreign currency liabilities
is also associated with expansions of domestic credit in many East European economies. While most
Eastern European countries display growth rates that are above the EMU average, the credit expansion
has been particularly strong in economies with a high share of foreign currency liabilities. Average credit
growth rates in Latvia and Estonia, for instance, exceed 40% on an annual basis. On the other hand,
the Czech Republic and Poland have much more moderate credit growth rates that are closer to those
within the EMU.



















Note: Mean of annual growth is calculated over the period 1995-2007 (for Slovenia only until 2006).
Source: IFS (IMF, 2008b), and own calculations.
A similar pattern can also be observed when expressing the credit expansions as a ratio of GDP (see
Figure 4). Within the last seven years, Estonia and Latvia have increased their credit-to-GDP ratios
from about 20% to more than 80%. Very substantial increases have also been observed in Romania,
Hungary, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia. While Poland was characterized by a much more moderate
increase, the Czech and Slovak Republic have even decreased their credit to GDP ratios.



















Note: Ratio of total outstanding bank credit to private sector (including households and enterprises) to GDP, at the end
of the year.
Source: EBRD (2008) survey of central banks, IFS (IMF, 2008b), and own calculations.
3 Asymmetric nancing opportunities across sectors
In this section of the paper, we aim to document the asymmetry in nancing opportunities across
sectors that is consistent with the high degree of foreign currency liabilities documented above. If small
or non-tradable sector rms denominate their debt in foreign currency to overcome credit constraints,
these credit constraints might be also observable directly in micro-data.
For the micro-data analysis we use the Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity Survey
(BEEPS), a rm-level survey database which is provided by the World Bank and EBRD (2005). This
survey includes responses on the rm's perception of nancial constraints. The sample includes 3900
interviewed rms in Central and Eastern European countries. While Poland, with 975 rms, has the
largest number of observations, Latvia and Lithuania are with only 205 rms the most narrowly repre-
sented. In this database the classication of rms is possible according to several criteria, e.g. their
size, location and/or export characteristics. Table 1 breaks down the data set along these dimensions.
Considering the size criterion, Table 1 shows that only 346 rms in the total sample are classied as
large, whereas 3554 rms are of either small or medium size.5 Considering the export criterion the
majority of rms are non-exporters (2845 rms) and about a quarter of the rms are exporters (1055
rms). Table 1 also shows the relationship between size and export characteristics. Large rms are by
5 SME have between 2 to 249 full-time employees, while large size rms have 250-9999 full-time workers. Firms with
more than 10.000 employees are not included in the survey. In the following tables small and medium businesses will
be referred to as "small" for simplicity.
6Table 1: Size Distributions of Firms
total firms non-export export
no. 3900 2845 1055
small 3554 76% 24%
large 346 44% 56%
Note: Small (and middle) rms are characterized by 2 to 249 full-time employees, while large size rms have 250-9999
full-time workers. Firms with more than 10.000 employees are excluded from the survey. Export rms include both direct
and indirect exporters.
Source: Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity Survey (World Bank and EBRD, 2005)
majority exporting rms (56%), while small and middle enterprises (SME) are typically non-exporters
(76%).
The BEEPS asks the rms about their perceived nancing restrictions. Table 2 shows that in our data
set of 3900 rms, 774 rms, i.e. 19.8% of all rms consider the access to nancial markets to be a
major obstacle in running their business.6 The percentage value varies across the type of rms. While
small and medium rms (20.7%) and non-export rms (20.4%) have somewhat higher gures, the share
of constrained large rms and constrained exporting rms is substantially lower (11.6% and 18.3%,
respectively). Looking at individual countries the dierences between large and small rms (see Table
2) can be conrmed for most countries. However, non-export rms are also more constrained in some
countries, namely Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
In the following empirical exercise, we aim to document this nding more formally in a binary regression
setup. We start with estimating the following regression to assess the existence of asymmetric nancing
opportunities across the sectors:
constrainti = c +   Fi + 1  non gov + 2  age +
9 X
n=1
Dn + "t; with i = 1;:::;3900 (1)
where constrainti is a dummy variable, which indicates, whether rm i considers the access to nancial
markets to be a major obstacle for running its business. Fi indicates various sector classications
including non-export rms, small rms and dierent non-tradable sectors. The dummy variable Dn
captures country specic eects. The regression set up is close to a related study by Schier and Weder
(2001).
6 Among individual countries this number varies. In countries, where a high growth rate of domestic credit was shown
in Figure 3, the percentages are substantially lower. The values range between 3.9% of all rms in Latvia up to 33.9%
of all rms in Poland.








no. of firms 3900 3554 346 2845 1055
19.8% 20.7% 11.6% 20.4% 18.3%
Bulgaria 16.0% 16.7% 10.0% 15.8% 16.7%
Czech Republic 17.2% 18.4% 3.7% 18.0% 14.5%
Estonia 5.9% 5.6% 9.5% 7.0% 3.2%
Hungary 23.8% 24.8% 12.2% 23.4% 24.4%
Lithuania 6.8% 7.0% 5.0% 5.7% 9.2%
Latvia 3.9% 3.8% 4.8% 3.7% 4.7%
Poland 33.9% 34.4% 27.5% 33.9% 34.0%
Romania 19.7% 20.9% 8.5% 21.0% 14.6%
Slovak Republic 7.7% 8.1% 4.5% 8.8% 5.5%
Slovenia 9.4% 10.3% 3.6% 12.4% 5.3%
share of constrained firms
share of constrained firms in:
Note: Firms are identied as constrained if they respond to consider the access to credit to be a "major obstacle" in
running their business.
Source: Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity Survey (World Bank and EBRD, 2005).
In the original data set, rms can assess the constraint in a range from 1 to 4, i.e. from "no obstacle"
to "major obstacle". For the probit and logit analysis (eq. 1) we create a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 only for the extreme response "major obstacle".7 non gov and age are further control
variables that capture the legal status (public or private) as well as the age of the rm.
The results for the baseline specication are reported in Table 3, where the rst two columns display
the results for the regression without control variables. We nd that the non-export rms - consistent
with the descriptive statistics reported above - have a higher value in their response to the nance
question in the survey data set. The dierences in the responses between export and non-export rms,
however, are not statistically signicant. This result is robust to dierent regression specication (probit
or logit) and to the application of control variables that capture the age of the rms, or the legal status
(non gov). There is much stronger evidence for dierences in the responses between large and small
rms. In the regressions 5 - 8 (see Table 3), the point estimates are much larger, and the dierence
between large and small rms is statistically signicant. Again, this result remains unaltered to changes
in the estimation procedure, or when further control variables are added. The positive and signicant
coecients for small rms show that the rm size is negatively correlated with nancial constraints.
While small rms are credit constrained, large rms, that have access to alternative nancing sources
(other than bank credit), experience credit constraints to much lesser extent. This nding is consistent
7 In an alternative set-up, we classied moderate(3) and major(4) obstacles as constraint. Hence, we get a broader
dummy. The results for this analysis are not presented but are similar to the ones in the paper.
8with a large body of literature that reports similar ndings for other regions and countries (see Schier
and Weder (2001) for a recent overview).
Furthermore, looking at the control variables, our analysis conrms the ndings of Schier and Weder
(2001) who nd that the share of governmental ownership increases the general nancing constraint,
i.e. that private rms have better access to nancing. The rm's date of foundation (age) has positive
(negative) impact on the nancial constraints, hence the obstacles for younger rms are larger.
Table 3: Financial asymmetries I
Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.065 0.106 0.049 0.078
[0.054] [0.095] [0.055] [0.097]
0.343 *** 0.625 *** 0.349 *** 0.625 ***
[0.095] [0.177] [0.101] [0.186]
-0.064 -0.100 -0.129 -0.209
[0.095] [0.169] [0.097] [0.172]
0.003 0.005 0.001 0.003
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Mc Fadden R
2 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.073






Note: Probit and logit regression results are shown, both excluding and including control variables. *,**,*** indicate
signicance at 10%, 5% or 1% level. Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
Source: Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity Survey (World Bank and EBRD, 2005), and own calculations.
In the next step of the exercise, we investigate the perceived credit constraints in various non-tradable
sectors of the economy. The survey data include 2840 rms which operate in the sectors construction
(8.6%), transport (7.1%), hotels (6.1%), wholesale (24.1%), real estate (11.5%), mining (0.4%) and
manufacturing (42.2%).8 While the degree to which sectors are tradable and non-tradable is dicult to
measure, most studies consider the construction sector, transportation, hotels and restaurants, as well
as wholesale trade and real estate as predominantly non-tradable sectors.
Table 4 provides evidence on the credit constraints in the potentially non-tradable sectors. We observe
that the point estimate for the dummy variable for rms in the construction and transportation sector is
positive, but insignicant, however (regressions 1 - 4). When interacting this dummy with the dummy
"small" (regressions 5 - 8) and "non gov" (regressions 9 - 12), the coecient becomes statistically
signicant. The hotels and restaurants' dummy has a negative sign (although again insignicant),
which does not alter when interacting with the "small" and "non gov" dummies.
8 We only consider rms in our analysis which operate to 100% in one of the aforementioned sectors. Furthermore, 158
rms state a sector labelled "others". These are skipped in our further analysis, as the sector's range is ambiguous.
9Finally, the wholesale and real estate sectors, also display large negative coecients. Furthermore,
these results are statistically signicant. Apparently these two sectors also experience easier access to
domestic credit.
Overall, our results suggest that some, but not all, potential non-tradable sectors appear to be more
credit constrained than the other sectors. In this aspect, our ndings for Eastern Europe do not fully
conrm those that were reported for emerging markets in Tornell and Westermann (2005) (also for a
Worldbank Survey analysis). A possible explanation could be that the survey used for our study was
taken in 2005, that constitutes in many countries the peak of a lending boom. Hence, the non-tradable
sector rms were not substantially disadvantaged with respect to tradable sector rms, that are more
likely to also have access to international capital markets.
10Table 4: Sectoral nancial asymmetries
Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
0.143 0.242 0.121 0.204
[0.095] [0.163] [0.095] [0.165]
0.177 * 0.302 * 0.155 0.262
[0.097] [0.167] [0.098] [0.169]
0.225 *** 0.385 *** 0.2 ** 0.342 **
[0.099] [0.169] [0.100] [0.171]
-0.068 -0.104 -0.070 -0.107
[0.095] [0.169] [0.095] [0.169]
0.003 * 0.005 * 0.003 * 0.005 * 0.002 0.004
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Mc Fadden R
2 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.071 0.071
obs 3900 3900 3894 3894 3900 3900 3894 3894 3900 3900 3894 3894
Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
0.156 0.274 0.154 0.271
[0.105] [0.181] [0.105] [0.182]
0.167 0.294 0.159 0.28
[0.111] [0.192] [0.111] [0.192]
0.22 * 0.383 * 0.206 * 0.359 *
[0.115] [0.196] [0.115] [0.197]
-0.058 -0.087 -0.067 -0.103
[0.096] [0.169] [0.095] [0.169]
0.003 * 0.005 * 0.003 * 0.005 * 0.002 0.004
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Mc Fadden R
2 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.071
obs 3900 3900 3894 3894 3900 3900 3894 3894 3900 3900 3894 3894
Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-0.102 -0.192 -0.107 -0.202
[0.129] [0.239] [0.129] [0.240]
-0.091 -0.169 -0.107 -0.202
[0.132] [0.245] [0.129] [0.240]
-0.087 -0.163 -0.097 -0.18
[0.134] [0.251] [0.135] [0.251]
-0.067 -0.105 -0.067 -0.105
[0.095] [0.169] [0.095] [0.169]
0.003 * 0.005 * 0.003 * 0.005 * 0.002 * 0.004 *
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Mc Fadden R
2 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.070
obs 3900 3900 3894 3894 3900 3900 3894 3894 3900 3900 3894 3894
Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-0.202 *** -0.37 *** -0.212 *** -0.388 ***
[0.067] [0.121] [0.067] [0.122]
-0.166 *** -0.303 *** -0.177 *** -0.324 ***
[0.068] [0.123] [0.068] [0.123]
-0.164 *** -0.299 *** -0.179 *** -0.326 ***
[0.069] [0.125] [0.070] [0.126]
-0.061 -0.099 -0.059 -0.094
[0.095] [0.169] [0.095] [0.169]
0.003 ** 0.006 ** 0.003 ** 0.006 ** 0.003 * 0.005 **
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Mc Fadden R
2 0.071 0.071 0.072 0.073 0.071 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.070 0.070 0.071 0.072
obs 3900 3900 3894 3894 3900 3900 3894 3894 3900 3900 3894 3894
Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-0.399 *** -0.731 *** -0.412 *** -0.752 ***
[0.108] [0.207] [0.108] [0.208]
-0.368 *** -0.673 *** -0.38 *** -0.692 ***
[0.109] [0.208] [0.109] [0.208]
-0.416 *** -0.789 *** -0.429 *** -0.809 ***
[0.119] [0.232] [0.119] [0.232]
-0.099 -0.157 -0.092 -0.145
[0.096] [0.170] [0.096] [0.170]
0.003 ** 0.006 ** 0.003 ** 0.006 * 0.003 * 0.005 *
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Mc Fadden R
2 0.073 0.072 0.074 0.074 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.073
obs 3900 3900 3894 3894 3900 3900 3894 3894 3900 3900 3894 3894
N-sector and small




































Note: Probit and logit regression results are shown, both excluding and including control variables. The rms are identied
according to their sector aliation. *,**,*** indicate signicance at 10%, 5% or 1% level. Standard errors are given in
parenthesis.
Source: Business Environment and Enterprise Productivity Survey (World Bank and EBRD, 2005), and own calculations.
114 A Sectoral Analysis of Output
According to the boom-bust cycle mechanism described above, asymmetric nancing opportunities
across sectors lead to cyclical ups and down in the sectoral composition of output. During the boom
period, the non-tradable sector grows faster and during the bust, it falls into a more severe and longer
recession than the tradable sector. The aggregate GDP that is often used as the only indicator for
economic policy, therefore masks a deeper pattern at the sectoral level. In this section, we compare the
cyclical sectoral patterns of Eastern European countries to a selected Western European countries and
show that cyclical uctuations at the sectoral level are indeed dierent in Eastern Europe.

























































































































Note: Gross value added data for NACE aggregates at constant prices (2000=100), in national currency and seasonal
adjusted are shown. The sectors are dened by the NACE-classication: agriculture, hunting, forestry and shing (A B),
total industry (excl. construction) (C D E), construction (F), wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport,
storage and communication (G H I) and nancial intermediation; real estate, renting and business activities(J K). The
bold line indicates the share of tradable sectors' output.
Source: Eurostat (2008), and own calculations.
As a rst pass, Figures 5 and 6 show that the composition of sectors in total gross value added data in
the CEECs is more volatile than in Western Europe, where the relative share of sectors in total output
is quite stable over time.

















































Note: Gross value added data for NACE aggregates at constant prices (2000=100), in national currency and seasonal
adjusted are shown. The sectors are dened by the NACE-classication: agriculture, hunting, forestry and shing (A B),
total industry (excl. construction) (C D E), construction (F), wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport,
storage and communication (G H I) and nancial intermediation; real estate, renting and business activities(J K). The
bold line indicates the share of tradables output.
Source: Eurostat (2008), and own calculations.
The standard deviations of the growth rates of each sector's output (reported in Table 5) conrm this
impression. For all sectors, the standard deviation in Eastern Europe is larger than in Western Europe.
The highest volatility is observed in the construction and agricultural sector, while industrial production,
and wholesale and retail trade rank among the sectors with quite low volatility.
In addition to the cyclical volatility of sectors, it is also interesting to observe the long-run trends of
sectoral output. Among the set of 10 countries it is visible that countries that were found to have
large increases in their credit-to-GDP ratios (see Figure 4), also have experienced increases in the share
of non-tradables relative tradables output.9 In particular, we observe substantial increases in tradables
output in Czech and Slovak Republic - the only two countries, where the credit-to-GDP ratio has fallen.
In all other countries the share of tradables output has either been stagnating or falling with respect to
the non-tradables output. Again, our ndings are consistent with the empirical results in the literature
that were reported for twin-crisis countries (Krueger and Tornell, 1999) as well as for a large cross
9 We dened tradables output as the sum of industrial production and agriculture. The bold line in Figures 5 and 6
indicates the share of tradable output relative to the non-tradable output.
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renting and business 
activities
Bulgaria 0.15960 0.10655 0.20874 0.09306 0.12160
Czech Republic 0.12447 0.06912 0.10065 0.04539 0.05345
Estonia 0.14284 0.06564 0.12969 0.05123 0.04171
Hungary 0.19661 0.03954 0.08743 0.02368 0.03494
Lithuania 0.09616 0.05540 0.14012 0.04586 0.03089
Latvia 0.08066 0.08478 0.14933 0.05843 0.07563
Poland 0.09523 0.04936 0.10687 0.02923 0.05018
Romania 0.14730 0.01954 0.10902 0.04853 0.05888
Slovenia 0.09662 0.03099 0.08308 0.02752 0.04253
Slovak Republic 0.13429 0.08585 0.23471 0.09684 0.12158
mean 0.12738 0.06068 0.13496 0.05198 0.06314
Euro Area 0.05128 0.02193 0.02667 0.01691 0.01072
Euro Area (12) 0.09523 0.04936 0.10687 0.02923 0.05018
Germany 0.10752 0.03236 0.05041 0.01963 0.01641
France 0.08670 0.01979 0.03209 0.02035 0.01357
mean 0.08518 0.03086 0.05401 0.02153 0.02272
Note: Standard deviations of sectoral growth rates are reported for each sector. "Mean" indicates the mean of the standard
deviations over the set of countries.
section of emerging markets (see IMF (2005) and Tornell and Westermann (2005)).
For a more formal analysis of sectoral comovements we merge individual sectors either to non-tradable
(N-sector) or to tradable sector (T-sector). The T-sector is the sum of agriculture, hunting, forestry and
shing and total industry (excl. construction). The N-sector is the sum of construction; wholesale and
retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and communication and nancial intermediation;
real estate, renting and business activities.10
The Johansen (1991) cointegration test results, which are reported in Table 6, indicate that common
long run trends between the two sectors are rare in the CEECs. Looking at the AIC criterion (Table 6
panel b), we nd that the sectoral output of the tradable and non-tradable sectors are not cointegrated
in 8 out of 10 countries. The only two countries, where evidence of common trends among tradables
and non-tradables sector exists are again Czech and Slovak Republic. These two countries where the
credit to GDP ratio has not been increasing. Selecting the lag length in the Johansen-procedure by the
SIC criterion we also nd the sectors in Poland to be cointegrated (see Table 6 panel a). Substantially
10 The NACE-classication is as follows: agriculture, hunting, forestry and shing (A B) and total industry (excl.
construction) (C D E), construction (F), wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and
communication (G H I) and nancial intermediation; real estate, renting and business activities(J K).
14more evidence is found among the Western European countries. For the Euro Area as whole, as well as
for each individual country, we nd evidence in favor of common trends at least using either one of the
two lag length criteria.
As a next step, we analyze whether the N- and T-sector have a common cyclical pattern, using the test
for common serial correlation that was rst developed by Engle and Kozicki (1993). The aim of this
technique is to construct a linear combination of two time series that removes the AR(p) feature from
both series. Interpreting the autoregressive component as the cycle, this can be referred to as a test for
common cycles in sectoral output data. The subsequent estimations are based on two-stage least square
(TSLS) as well as on general methods of moments (GMM) that was later proposed by Cubadda and
Hecq (2001). The TSLS common cycle results are shown in Table 7 and 8. The previous cointegration
results are taken into account by including the error correction terms in the list of instruments. We
nd that only the Lithuanian sectors show evidence of a common cycle. The null hypothesis of a
common serial correlation feature cannot be rejected at the 5% level and the common cycle coecient
is statistically signicant. For all other countries evidence on cyclical comovement does not exist, as
either the null of a common cycle is rejected or the coecient in the cofeature vector is insignicant.
Tables 9 and 10 show the results for the GMM estimates. We again reject the null hypothesis in all
cases, and hence, we conrm that no common sectoral cycles are present in the data. 11 With respect
to common cycles, Tables 8 and 10 show that our results do not dier between Eastern and Western
Europe.12
11 For Romania we can reject the null, but bear in mind that for Romania only 35 observations are available. The
cofeature coecient is not signicant either.
12 For Western Europe this conrms the previous nding of Cheung and Westermann (2003) who nd only little evidence

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16Table 7: TSLS Common cycle Results for CEECs
CF- coefficient -0.37 -0.09 0.45 * -0.26 * 0.66 * -0.10 0.13 -0.10 -0.42 0.00







Poland Romania Slovenia Estonia Hungary Lithuania
Note: The Common Feature coecient and the F-statistic of the TSLS estimation are reported. The optimal lag length
is determined by SIC. * indicates signicance either of the coecient or the F-statistic. The bold cases indicate that an
error correction term was included when computing the common feature test statistic.
Table 8: TSLS Common cycle Results for EMU
CF- coefficient 0.45 * 0.47 * 0.07 0.50 * 0.48 *





Note: The Common Feature coecient and the F-statistic of the TSLS estimation are reported. The optimal lag length
is determined by SIC. * indicates signicance either of the coecient or the F-statistic. The bold cases indicate that an
error correction term was included when computing the common feature test statistic. While Euro Area (12) only applies
to the original set of EMU countries, Euro Area includes all current EMU countries.
Table 9: GMM Common cycle Results for CEECs
           -statistic 13.005 10.295 18.493 21.705 5.973 24.773 11.190 0.163 22.434 4.254
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.686 0.000 0.039
coefeature coefficent 0.396 0.226 -2.036 0.486 -1.324 -0.998 -0.657 0.154 0.399 -0.699









2 statistics with the corresponding p-values are reported. Furthermore, the coecient in the co-feature vector
and the corresponding T-statistic are presented. The optimal lag length is determined by SIC.
Table 10: GMM Common cycle Results for EMU
          -statistic 19.408 10.894 19.887 32.949 13.793
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
coefeature coefficent -1.461 -1.426 -0.332 -1.900 -1.513







2 statistics with the corresponding p-values are reported. Furthermore, the coecient in the co-feature vector
and the corresponding T-statistic are presented. The optimal lag length is determined by SIC. While Euro Area (12) only
applies to the original set of EMU countries, Euro Area includes all current EMU countries.
175 Policy implications and scope for nancial regulation
The aim of the present paper was to document credit market imperfections in Eastern Europe and to
point out the likely impact on business cycles, both at the aggregate and at the sectoral level.
The results reported in this paper, furthermore, help to identify the appropriate conceptual framework in
which EMU aspirant countries in Eastern Europe might want think about the question of whether or not
to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). Most of the literature focusses on the traditional optimal
currency area framework by Robert Mundell (1961). The OCA model (in his earlier version) would
suggest that in the case of asymmetric business cycles, the exibility of the exchange rate is needed to
smooth asymmetric shocks across countries. A common monetary policy would constitute a loss in the
perspective of a individual country as it reduces the set of instruments needed for stabilization.
This view is not correct, however, in the presence of strong credit market imperfections. In a boom-bust
cycle model (such as Schneider and Tornell (2004)), the exchange rate will amplify, rather than smooth
business cycle uctuations. The credit market imperfections that give rise to the second type of model,
include contract enforceability problems that lead to asymmetric nancing opportunities across sectors
and currency mismatch, as well as expected implicit bailout guarantees. Lahiri et al. (2006) have recently
shown that the distinction between countries with and without severe credit market imperfections also
alters the optimal monetary policy under both xed and exible exchange rates.
The preliminary evidence suggests that there is no uniform answer to the question whether Eastern Eu-
ropean countries should be considered as emerging market economies with credit market imperfections
that have led to boom-bust cycles and nancial crisis in the past. Although most countries show re-
markable similarities, others are more closed, and thus, the traditional OCA literature seems appropriate.
In particular countries, where the share of foreign currency liabilities is high, might want to think about
an early adoption of the Euro to safeguard against a possible depreciation of the currency. The most
recent appreciation that has taken place since the end of 2008 may already be a rst test for highly
euroized countries.
The argument for an early Euro adoption presented in this paper is related to a literature that documents
that exchange rate stability in general is good for output growth (see de Grauwe and Schnabl, 2008;
Schnabl, 2007).13 Note, however, that simply xing the nominal exchange rate, as some countries have
13 Furthermore, Razin and Rubinstein (2006) provide direct evidence of the eect of dollarization on growth. While their
main argument of the paper is to point out that exchange rate regimes aect growth via dierent channels, they also
18already done, is not likely to be a sucient step to safeguard against the mechanism described above.
Many countries that experienced twin banking and currency crisis had maintained a xed exchange rate
until just before the crisis occurred.
Finally, the results give rise to questions in the context of the discussion on nancial regulation and
the appropriate response to the current worldwide nancial crisis which also aects, at least indirectly,
Eastern Europe (For a discussion see Maechler et al. (2007); Tamirisa and Igan (2008)). Should the
degree of foreign currency liabilities be regulated? Should the "excessive" lending be stopped or at
least slowed down by speed controls in lending? From a long term perspective the answer is not
obvious. First, the strong expansions of credit are not inappropriate when an economy recovers from
a situation of severe underinvestment. Our results from the rm level data set suggest that there still
exist substantial credit constraints, which constitute a major concern for at least a subset of rms in the
economy. Secondly, the occasional crisis that have occurred in many regions, in particular in Asia and
Latin America, have been associated with a higher long run per capita growth (Ranci ere et al., 2008).
Thus, there is a trade o. A direct prevention of boom-bust cycles via capital controls, or regulations
on foreign currency lending might be successful in stabilizing the business cycle. But this stabilization
is at the expense of a low long term trend. Each country will need to decide based on its preferences,
which of the two positions to choose.
show that after controlling for the eects of crisis dollarization does not have independent inuences on growth.
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22A Appendix
Table 11: Current exchange rate regimes
Current Exchange Rate Regimes Possible Date of Euro Adoption
Bulgaria euro-based currency boards no target date for adoption
Czech Republic managed floating with the euro as 
reference currency
no target date for adoption, but first version 
of the National Euro Changeover Plan was 
adopted on 11 April 2007.
Estonia ERM II (currency board with fixed peg to 
euro)
National Euro Adoption Plan (6
th updated 
version) was adopted on 29 November 
2007.
Hungary float in combination with inflation targeting National Changeover Plan in July 2008 (1
st 
ed.) without target date for adoption
Latvia ERM II ( exchange rate fluctuation band of 
+/-1%)
specific target date is dropped in 
September 2007 (update of the National 
Euro Changeover Plan)
Lithuania ERM II (currency board with fixed peg to 
euro)
no specific target date for the adoption, 
National Changeover Plan was updated in 
April 2007.
Poland free float with inflation targeting accession plan to ERM II by mid 2009, 
anticipated euro adoption for 2012
Romania managed float with the euro as reference 
currency
target date is set for January 2014, 
preferred changeover via 'big bang' 
scenario.
Slovak Republic member of EMU (since January 2009) -
Slovenia member of EMU (since January 2007) -
±
Note: As of January 2009. Several countries have withdrawn preliminary target dates.
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2008); ECB (2008) and national central banks.
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